

Barry Smith – *The Division of Deontic Labor* Contemporary philosophy of collective agency, as illustrated by the work of Searle, Bratman, Gilbert, Pettit and others, focuses predominantly on small groups of agents sharing common goals. In his groundbreaking paper “Massively Shared Agency” of 2014, Scott Shapiro shows the limits of this approach when dealing with the large groups of agents that form industrial corporations, armies, or systems of law enforcement. Such groups will involve alienated or uncommitted participants pursuing motives of their own. And as Shapiro shows, they can manifest shared agency only when the actions of all participants are coordinated through authority structures organized hierarchically. Here I wish to focus on that dimension of massively shared agency that has to do with the transmission of authority. I will show that while such transmission almost always involves communication through speech (or through the digital counterparts of speech), transmission of this sort is too transient, and falls short of creating the type of enduring intermeshing of plans and intentions that is required for the imposition of hierarchical authority structures across large organizations. To create and maintain the needed hierarchical authority structures what is required are complexes of intermeshed documents. Such documents provide for what we can think of as a division of deontic labor, allowing plans, orders, and obligations to be meshed together over time.

Savina Raynaud – *Images, Meaning, Truth. Austro-German Denkpsychologie facing the challenge* How is it possible to rely on experience and to transcend it at the same time? This is not only a deep and fundamental question for metaphysical argumentation, but also a daily task for human communication, both in ordinary and in scientific language. In this talk, I wish to consider Anton Marty’s semantic theory concerning the Humboldtian notion of inner linguistic form: expressed images are appreciated as auxiliary figurative means working in order to suggest thoughts and to support the enacting of psychic process. In addition, such images differ in different languages, testifying to the creativity of their respective communities and are unable, as yet, to be identified with the proper meanings of the expressions in which they are used. The gap between observable phenomena and their related images on one hand, and the upper psychic activities on the other hand has been studied extensively by the school of experimental psychology, beginning in the same town where Brentano had conceived his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*: Würzburg. We will consider two Viennese contributions stemming from this tradition: Karl Bühler’s 1934 work, *Theory of language* concerning inner linguistic form from a “sematological” perspective and Karl Popper’s 1928 thesis (supervised by Bühler himself): *On the Problem of Method in the Psychology of Thought*. We will argue the validity of such a theoretical proposal in the present debate.

Massimo Dell’Utri – *Truth, Image, Norm* Centuries of discussions about the concept of truth seem to instil in the 21st century philosopher the conviction that the so-called deflationary conceptions of truth are inescapable – i.e., virtually without decent competitors. Granting that this is so, it remains to be ascertained which deflationary conception, among the many advanced in the literature, is the most plausible and why. This is the aim of my talk. In the course of the exposition I will briefly comment on the concepts of image and norm, usually called up when speaking of truth.

Wojciech Zelaniec – *Norms and other classes of sentences that may be true or false* That norms are neither true or false seems to be – *pace* Arne Næss – an unshakeable dogma of much of contemporary philosophy. This dogma, as I am arguing drawing in part on Giuseppe Lorini’s work, rests on a mistake (of confounding norms and commands) and where it does not, it could be used to discredit the truth value of, amongst other things, propensities and probabilities statements, scientific laws, and of what the Conte school in Italy has called ‘thetic propositions’. A hopeless cul-de-sac? Not necessarily – if your ontology is rich enough to admit ‘deontic states of affairs’.

Giuseppe Lorini, Stefano Moroni – *How to do rules with drawings* Usually, people think that we can only make rules with words. Several philosophers and jurists adopt this perspective, implicitly or explicitly assuming both that rules are made *by means of* words and that rules are made *of* words. Both assumptions may be criticized. First of all, certain rules are not made with words. For instance, some rules are made with drawings (e.g., traffic signs and land-use plans); others are produced making a sound (e.g., the referee’s or warden’s whistle); and others through a silent gesture (e.g., the warden’s halt through a hand gesture). In the second place, rules are something different from the form we choose to express them in. In the present paper we focus on rules made with drawings: drawn rules. We will investigate the “phenomenology” of this kind of rules and we will try to define a “typology” of them. Finally, we will discuss the specific features of drawn rules that distinguish them from linguistic ones (i.e., rules formulated in words).

Paolo Spinicci – *Despotic images: a taxonomy and some more remarks* In the history of visual arts there are many paintings and photos representing orders or authoritative gestures, but they are not the object of my talk, although they can teach us how people receiving or giving orders look like. Despotic images are more demanding. They do not simply *represent* orders or authoritative behaviors: they are imperative in nature. They are able to give orders to their spectators, involving them in a communicative stance. Hence the two aims of my talk: first, I will sketch a (provisional) definition and taxonomy of despotic images and, second, I will try to understand what despotic images have to say about the general nature of pictures and the different ways of their reception.

Olimpia Giuliana Loddo – *Christiana: A pictorial common law* Christiania is self-proclaimed autonomous neighbourhood located in the centre of Copenhagen that is ruled by a pictorial common law. In fact, the norms of Christiania's Common Law are pictorially represented and are displayed in several posters that can be seen in different parts of Christiania's territory. The aim of this paper is to analyze the pictorial representation of Christiania's Common Law. Christiania's Common Law's pictograms hide many different kinds of messages. The icons of Christiania's Common Law communicate both of normative messages (for instance, the values spontaneously accepted by Christiania's people, or what kind of people is not welcome to Christiania) and of non-normative messages (for example, several information about Christiania history and traditions). Moreover, I will focus on the nine normative images of Christiania's Common Law that aim to represent nine prohibitions of Christiania's normative system. These images *prima facie* appear to share some features with traffic signs, despite that, as the examples will clarify, they are different in kind. Indeed, while traffic sign's physical support and location are necessary condition for the norm to be binding, Christiania's Common Law seems to be in force independently from its iconic representation and its concrete material support. On the other hand, even if the meanings of the different pictograms are not connected with the physical place where they are located, their deepest meaning can be fully understood only on the basis of Christiania's cultural and institutional background.

Tibor Barany, Reka Markovich – *The Perlocution Model of Pictorial Advertising* Advertising regulations implicitly rely on the notion of a perlocutionary act. The aim of advertising is to influence the audience by means of the speech act or pictorial act in a particular way: encouraging consumption, persuading the audience that the product in question is buying, and so on. According to several current analyses of linguistic and pictorial speech acts, a perlocutionary act should be described as the link between the (verbal/pictorial) utterance and some of its causal effects (Kissine 2008; Sbisà 2007). Advertising regulations apply to these causal effects that obtain because the affected person perceives the utterance as a phonetic, phatic, locutionary, propositional and/or illocutionary act. Interestingly enough, the regulation seems to be almost completely indifferent as to which type of speech act triggered the undesired effects; the regulations consider only the consequences the pictures and verbal utterances have actually led to. In our presentation we provide an account of the nature of advertising in terms of the (intended and unintended) perlocutionary effects of pictorial and verbal utterances. We argue that – contrary to what we might initially think – there are genuine differences between verbal and pictorial communication. In case of pictorial ads, we cannot stipulate an autonomous level of propositional semantic content which would form the basis for regulations in terms of the truthfulness of the content conveyed.

Federico Faroldi, Guglielmo Feis – *Is representationality necessary for normativity?* In this paper we aim to attack the following question: "Is representationality necessary for normativity?" by debunking two of its presuppositions. *First*, we argue that the question cannot be independent from a philosophically and empirically informed theory of how thought and representation work. *Second*, we argue that even an empirically informed account cannot deal with the question whether representationality is necessary for normativity unless there is enough clarity on what normativity is. Our heuristic hypothesis is the following: Humean (desire-based) theories of normativity will more readily admit that representationality is not necessary for normativity, whereas non-Humean theories (theories based on reasons, social facts, and so on) should typically require more structure, and therefore will require representationality as a necessary condition for normativity. In the end, we discuss some examples and sketch some possible future paths of theoretical and empirical research.