

François Dosse – *L'imaginaire social comme moteur de l'histoire chez Ricoeur et Castoriadis* La dimension imaginaire est tout à fait essentielle chez Ricoeur et chez Castoriadis, chacun à sa manière. Dans *La Métaphore vive*, Ricoeur démontre en quoi la métaphore n'est pas un simple trope, mais qu'elle est porteuse d'une dimension créative revisitant le référent. Pour sortir de la clôture du texte sur lui-même, Ricoeur pratique un véritable retournement de l'amont vers l'aval du texte, le ré-ouvrant à un champ de multiples possibles dans sa dimension poétique. Il assigne un rôle majeur à la métaphore, dont il pose les limites : « *Fonder* ce qui a été appelé vérité métaphorique, c'est aussi *limiter* le discours poétique. » Ricoeur rappelle comment le genre dont relève la métaphore, la rhétorique, est tombé en désuétude alors qu'Aristote lui donnait une grande ambition, celle de régir les usages de la parole publique. La proximité est grande avec un Castoriadis qui place l'imaginaire radical au plan de l'individu et l'imagination sociale au plan collectif au cœur du social-historique. Tous deux se trouvent en rupture avec la conception marxienne d'un imaginaire relégué dans les déformations idéologiques de la superstructure. Tout part pour eux de l'imaginaire social qui constitue l'horizon fondamental de la praxis.

Christian Delacroix – *Les limites de la représentation en histoire: la question des images* En 2001 un texte de Georges Didi-Huberman à propos de quatre photos prises en 1944 à Auschwitz par un déporté juif membre du Sonderkommando du camp déclenche une vive polémique. Elle oppose G. Didi-Huberman qui considère que ces images ont, « malgré tout », une valeur de représentation de l'extermination à ceux qui, avec Claude Lanzmann, défendent l'idée de la visualisation impossible de la Shoah qui est selon eux un fait « irréprésentable ». Cette nouvelle « querelle des images » interpelle en premier lieu les historiens : l'idée d'un événement ou d'un fait irréprésentable est-elle acceptable pour eux ? Quels en sont les enjeux pour la discipline historique ? Au plan ontologique d'abord : qu'est-ce qui caractériserait un tel événement par rapport aux autres événements ? Ce type d'interrogation concerne notamment la question de l'unicité de la Shoah et la notion même d'unicité en histoire. Au plan épistémologique en second lieu : l'image est-elle une source comme les autres pour l'historien ? Ce type d'interrogation comprend notamment les questions de l'opérativité en histoire de la notion de représentation et de l'idée des « limites de la représentation » ainsi que celle de l'image comme preuve. Pour analyser ces questions les travaux de Paul Ricoeur seront des points d'appui privilégiés.

Pier Luigi Lecis – *Imagery and Persuasion in Historical knowledge* The relationship between history, science and literature, in the Eighties of Twentieth Century, was a prominent subject in philosophy of history; history is not only knowledge, but also a writing enterprise. The narrativist approach (chiefly in the radical version of Hayden White's paradigm) raised a strong controversy about the role of figurative language and tropes in the linguistic representation of the past. Paul Ricoeur proposed an interesting critique about vices and virtues of this approach and an interesting theoretic perspective on rhetoric dimension of historical discourse, entwined with epistemic and ethics ones. He contended that rhetoric profile does not concern only the tropologic aspect of historical works, but chiefly persuasive and argumentative ones. We can claim that narrative is not only a form of writing. Narrative and rhetoric have a cognitive role in historical knowledge, but overestimating them entails relativistic and sceptic consequences in regard to truth and objectivity in history.

Silvana Borutti – *Scrittura, traccia, immagine. La concezione della storiografia di Michel de Certeau* Scrive Michel de Certeau che la scrittura della storia rimpiazza e insieme esclude le voci dei morti, che parlano ancora nel "texte-tombeau que l'érudition élève à leur place". Egli radicalizza così il tema della traccia, considerandola non semplice luogotenenza, ma "revenance" dell'altro, che ritorna come un rimosso e segna il discorso storico (il "testo-tomba") di un'inquietante estraneità. Con questa potente inversione di prospettiva (che rende difficile ascrivere la prospettiva di Certeau soltanto a un contributo di epistemologia della storiografia), egli studia "assenza" e "traccia" non come condizioni della storiografia, ma come suoi prodotti: il lavoro presente della storia come produzione del passato, della sua assenza e delle sue tracce. Certeau connette in questo modo l'epistemologia della storia con temi che definirei di ontologia storica. Nel mio intervento, analizzerò i temi centrali dell'*ermeneutica dell'assenza* elaborata da Certeau. Considererò in particolare una declinazione specifica del tema della traccia, legata all'analisi di immagini.

Vinicio Busacchi – *Immagine e rappresentazione nella conoscenza storica/Image and representation in the historical knowledge* Proceeding from a survey on the current state of the debate around the concept and function of representation in the philosophy of history, this contribution investigates the epistemological question of representation in historical knowledge from an *indirect* point of view. It does not aim at a direct analysis of the dialectical relationship between [1] rhetorical-narrative construction and writing of history (M. de Certeau, H. White), between [2] hermeneutics and epistemology of historical knowledge (P. Ricoeur), between [3] explanation and understanding (von Wright, Ricoeur), and between [4] meaning, truth and reference in historical representation (Ankersmit). The question will be resetting from the point of view of the representation (a) as a mechanism/dynamism of mind and memory, and (b) as a linguistic instrument and as an instrument of knowing. The intent is to explore how (and with what legitimacy) imaginative-representative function contributes to "solve" the duplicity of historical reality as (a) something "passed",

no-longer-existing, and (b) existing in the past, “yet-existing”. In this way, it could be possible to grasp a central crux, a point of origin of the epistemological problem of explanation, understanding and representation in historical knowledge.

Alberto Peruzzi *Schemi cinestetici e metafore nella matematica* La filosofia della matematica si è configurata nella prima metà del Novecento come strettamente legata ai progetti fondazionali (logicismo, formalismo, intuizionismo, teoria assiomatica degli insiemi). Nella seconda metà del Novecento è emerso l’approccio della grammatica cognitiva e tale legame si è ridotto. In base a tale approccio il pensiero matematico si costruisce combinando fra loro una serie di metafore, ciascuna delle quali sarebbe radicata in specifici schemi sensomotori inerenti alla corporeità. Ne è scaturita la tesi che il pensiero matematico sia essenzialmente metaforico. Pur muovendo dall’ipotesi di una serie di schemi immaginativi di carattere cinestetico, la presente relazione argomenterà 1) il carattere letterale del discorso matematico, proprio in quanto riferito a tali schemi, 2) il vantaggio offerto dall’impostazione categoriale nel descrivere i trasferimenti di schemi da un dominio a un altro, e 3) le conseguenze che ne derivano per la valutazione dei progetti fondazionali elaborati nella prima metà del Novecento.

Elisa Caldarola *Caricatures as Prop-Oriented Make Believe* Caricatures seem to pose a puzzle. On the one hand, by their nature, they misrepresent their subjects to some extent. On the other hand, they seem to be useful representational aids: a caricature can sometimes reveal an aspect of its subject that a more faithful representation would fail to render. How is this possible? How can a form of representation that is by definition inaccurate be so representationally powerful? This paper brings together two ideas. First, the puzzle raised by caricatures somehow resembles the puzzle raised by figurative language. Metaphors, taken at face value, are usually false: men are not wolves. The same goes for hyperbolic talk: Putnam did not change his position one billion times in his career. Still, figurative language is expressively powerful: by saying that human beings are wolves or that Putnam changed his position one billion times in his career one conveys, in a very vivid way, some true information about the world (that human beings are cruel, that Putnam frequently changed opinion). Second, Walton’s theory of make believe is at the same time an account of the phenomenon of depiction and other forms of representation and an account of figurative language as prop-oriented make believe. This suggests the possibility of treating caricatures in analogy with figurative language. This is the suggestion we are going to explore.

Filip Buekens – *The Truth about Accuracy* Accuracy, like *relevance* and *salience*, is an elusive notion. Our aim in this paper is to *precisify* a useful concept in epistemology and philosophy of science by locating it within a network of epistemic and practical principles. Accuracy, we argue, is a property of representations and models, while truth is a property of propositions or contents. The key differences between accuracy and truth is not always acknowledged, and many philosophers use both concepts interchangeably. Ernest Sosa begins a recent presentation of his acclaimed virtue approach to knowledge with the thesis that ‘(b)belief is a kind of performance, which attains one level of success if it is true (or accurate)...’ (Sosa 2011, p. 3). The principle that ‘an epistemic agent ought to approximate the truth’, is called *Accuracy* by Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010). Michael Lynch (2005, p. 23) holds that ‘(beliefs) are accurate, or true, when they represent (the) world as being as it is.’ In a paper that explores what makes truth good, Linda Zagzebski holds that ‘(b)elief aims at accurately representing some part of reality propositionally. When a belief is true it is accurate’ (Zagzebski 2004, p. 135-6, note omitted). This tendency is unfortunate, because accuracy enjoys a number of properties truth lacks. It admits of degrees, is relative to standards, sensitive to extra-epistemic goals and, most importantly, both properties have different objects. Accuracy is a property of representational devices (pictures, diagrams, models) while truth is a property of contents. Accuracy is relational, truth isn’t. In the first part of our paper we show how truth and accuracy are clearly distinguished in Frege’s *Der Gedanke*: a postcard ‘corresponds’, but a proposition doesn’t. Wittgenstein, confuses both notions (“2.21 Das Bild stimmt mit der Wirklichkeit überein oder nicht; es ist richtig oder unrichtig, wahr oder falsch.”). A simple formal argument shows that cashing out truth as accurately representing something leads to an infinite regress. In the second part of our paper we give an account of accuracy and accurate representations. The full model should include a representation R , the object represented $f(R)$, a way W of representing and a Project P which requires that $f(R)$ is represented by R in way W and an operational standard S which determines to what degree the representation R should be accurate, given W and P . Propositions semantically characterize representations or models, but a representation can’t be reduced to a conjunction of propositions. In the final part of our presentation, we explain how the approach explains confusions between true or false contents and accurate vs. inaccurate representations. We can be minimalists about truth, but we need a substantial notion of accuracy to account for the way representations, models and images function in epistemic and pragmatic projects.